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SOCIAL MACHINES:
TEXTUAL
TECHNOLOGIES IN
ENLIGHTENMENT
BRITAIN
Emily D. Spunaugle
Novel Machines: Technology and
Narrative Form in Enlightenment
Britain by Joseph Drury. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017.
272 pp. Cloth $85.00.

In Novel Machines: Technology and
Narrative Form in Enlightenment
Britain, Joseph Drury reads the
narrative techniques deployed
by eighteenth-century novelists
as machines developed to contend with fluctuating social and
moral landscapes within the
Enlightenment. He places his work
in line with science and technology
studies in order to examine the
social anxieties about new machines
but foregrounds, specifically, literary forms. Drury stresses not the
newness or emergence of literary
techniques, or “technical codes,” in
his eighteenth-century context, but
through defamiliarization, Drury
answers the call to historicize
the techniques that have become
“some of the most distinctive formal features of realist fiction” (4).
For its successful engagement with
broad periods of philosophy, history, and literary criticism, and
for a compelling intervention in
New Formalism, Novel Machines
will find admirers among scholars
from periods outside the eighteenth
century.
Drury grounds his study in
a sophisticated historiography
of literary theory and contemporaneous philosophers of technology in order to critique the
machinery of the Enlightenment.
Within and outside of literary
studies, scholarship has metaphorized eighteenth-century technology according to power or play:
Foucault’s Panopticon has long
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supported suspicious theoretical readings, and the whimsy of
eighteenth-century clockmaker
Christopher Pinchbeck’s musical
automata has come to represent
a polarized alternative. To motivate the move beyond the technosuspicious and techno-neutral
positions, Drury employs New
Formalism as the middle ground,
revealing the eighteenth century’s cultural penchant for using
machines to model human physiology, which construed humanity
as cyborg long before the advent
of hyperlinks and algorithms.
Using an anthro-agnostic approach that erases ontological distinction, Drury examines the
relationships between authors,
texts, and their readers, as “[t]he
machines featured in eighteenth
century fiction are also occasions
for self-reflexive commentary on
the formal dimensions of narrative fiction and their effects on
readers” (3).
As case studies, Drury’s chapters explore the extended representation of the deliberating mind in
Eliza Haywood’s amatory fiction;
Henry Fielding’s performative,
self-conscious narrator; Laurence
Sterne’s digressive, non-linear narration; and Ann Radcliffe’s atmospheric descriptions of acousmatic
sound. While the literary texts are
organized chronologically across
the long eighteenth century from
Haywood to Radcliffe, Drury
suggests not a cumulative and
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progressive linkage between his
four examples but insists on the
engagement of each author with
philosophy and popular opinions of each historically situated
technological innovation. In the
chapter “Libertines and Machines
in Love in Excess,” for example,
Drury pits the amatory fiction of
the Earl of Rochester against that
of Eliza Haywood, teasing out
the gendered debates in mechanical philosophy that inhere therein.
Drury differentiates the properly
Hobbesian regard for the materiality of the soul from the “Hobbists’”
argument that externally motivated
actions absolve the responsibility of
the individual, supporting the libertine dismissal of civil and moral
laws. Drury holds that Haywood’s
Hobbesian engagement disrupts
this libertine logic by showing
that when a woman struggles for
morality against her own sexual
desire, “the automatism of desire
does not deprive the individual of
either freedom of action or responsibility” (54). Drury’s close reading
of Haywood’s seemingly contradictory treatment of Amena’s “volition and culpability” in Love in
Excess ultimately reveals a kind of
protofeminism, wherein Haywood
leverages the predictable, mechanical nature of the novel as a disciplinary machine to reveal a sexual
double standard that inevitably
entraps women as immoral (56).
Drury lands on a kind of essentialism that concedes to women a
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“narrowly prudential moral superiority to men” (69).
Just as Haywood’s representation
of arousal-and-abeyance applauds
rational introspection before action,
so does chapter 3, “Realism’s Ghosts
Science and Spectacle in Tom Jones,”
show fiction’s development alongside the production of the scientific discourses of engineering and
credible knowledge. Drury stresses
natural philosophers’ work in the
period to differentiate burgeoning
scientific inquiry from mere magic
trick, although each relied on sensational optics for its buy-in: natural philosophy, within the project
of the Enlightenment, however,
instrumentalized its showmanship as “philosophical rather than
superstitious, enlightened rather
than credulous” (5). As an example,
Drury shows how the performative
nature of Tom Jones is “constitutive,
rather than disruptive” in establishing the “epistemological utility of
narrative fiction” (86), useful for
manipulating the public’s refined
taste for spectacle into a literacy
of discernment. Drury shows that
Fielding replicates the mechanics
of charlatanry, while altering the
“initially visceral wonder into a
cooler, more reflective appreciation
of its orderly design” (98).
The most compelling of the
chapters not previously published is
chapter 4, “The Speed of Tristram
Shandy,” wherein Drury—contra
the thrust of extant literature on
Sterne’s novel, which underscores
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the novel’s deconstructive rejection of a linear, progressive narrative—reads the digressions as
intentional braking devices on
Sterne’s narrative machine. Drury
focuses on Tristram’s famous coach
race against death as a special case
of a larger trend of fictive literature
of the eighteenth century, including it-narratives, tending toward
the digressive as a means of slowing the immoral, gluttonous consumption of texts. Buttressed with
Tristram’s/Sterne’s continual asides
and addresses in favor of deep,
attentive reading, Drury reveals the
rooted suspicion that novels shaped
“subjectivity in the wrong way and
obliged conformity to the wrong
moral norms” (119). Drawing on
contemporaneous travel writers,
coachmakers, and Sterne’s own
journals, Drury reads the speed of
the post-chaise as a cultural vehicle
for disrupting social relations while
facilitating other kinds of intimate
liaisons and elopements: the sexual
temptation represented by the stationary coach, as well as the suggestive personalized pleasure afforded
by the coach’s jolts and jostles.
Slowing the speed of the narrative
Tristram is writing, as well as the
corresponding time for readers to
consume the text, introduces a new
reading poetics, as the recounting
of Uncle Toby’s sexual exploits is
forever in abeyance. In this way,
Drury holds that just as moving
pell-mell in a post-chaise must
inevitably shorten its duration, so
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Sterne is “teaching readers to look
for their pleasures somewhere else
than in the discharge of closure”—
in the digressions and anticlimactic
deferral of Uncle Toby’s exploits
(140).
Given the necessary mediation
of the texts of Fielding, Sterne,
Haywood, and Radcliffe through
one particular machine, the printing
press, its absence in Novel Machines
is conspicuous—especially on the
verge of remarkable changes in
printing technology at the outset of the Industrial Revolution.
Drury’s studied omission of contemporaneous textual awareness to printing technologies in
Novel Machines, however, gives
way to his innovative readings of
literary form as technology. The
engagement of Novel Machines
not only extends science and technology studies of the eighteenth
century but also shares affinities
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with other scholarship showing
books and texts acting upon the
body, such as Kathleen Lubey’s
Excitable Imaginations: Eroticism
and Reading in Britain, 1660–
1760 (Bucknell, 2012) (specifically,
Drury’s chapter 2), or the mechanics of contrived control over readers argued in Christina Lupton’s
Knowing Books: The Consciousness
of Mediation in Eighteenth-Century
Britain (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011). For its clarity, literature-forward intellectual history,
compelling close readings, and
engagement with science and technology studies, Novel Machines will
find readers from within and outside its historical period.
Emily D. Spunaugle is Assistant Professor
and Humanities and Rare Books Librarian
at Oakland University, where she is
co-director of the Marguerite Hicks Project.
Her research focuses on book history,
bibliography, and women’s writing in the
long eighteenth century.
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